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Abstract To develop and validate a taxonomy to classify
and support the analysis of adverse events related to patient
handovers in hospital settings. A taxonomy was established
using descriptions of handover events extracted from
incident reports, interviews and root cause analysis reports.
The inter-rater reliability and distribution of types of
handover failures and causal factors. The taxonomy con-
tains five types of failures and seven types of main causal
factors. The taxonomy was validated against 432 adverse
handover event descriptions contained in incident reports
(stratified random sample from the Danish Patient Safety
Database, 200 events) and 47 interviews with staff con-
ducted at a large hospital in the Capital Region (232
events). The most prevalent causes of adverse events are
inadequate competence (30 %), inadequate infrastructure
(22 %) and busy ward (18 %). Inter-rater reliability
(kappa) was 0.76 and 0.87 for reports and interviews,
respectively. Communication in clinical contexts has been
widely recognized as giving rise to potentially hazardous
events, and handover situations are particularly prone to
failures of communication or unclear allocation of
responsibility. The taxonomy provides a tool for analyzing
adverse handover events to identify frequent causes among
reported handover failures. In turn, this provides a basis for
selecting safety measures including handover protocols and
training programmes.
Keywords Taxonomy  Adverse events  Patient safety 
Patient handover  Patient handoff  Communication
1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been an increased focus on
patient safety during patient handovers. If a patient hand-
over is carried out improperly so that wrong or inadequate
information is received, or important information is miss-
ing, or responsibility for care of the patient becomes
unclear, the patient may suffer serious harm.
Several studies have shown that handovers are associated
with adverse events (Arora et al. 2005; Pezzolesi et al. 2010;
Cohen and Hilligoss 2010) and initiatives have recently been
launched to reduce adverse events associated with hand-
overs, including an extensive programme introduced by the
Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Healthcare
to develop and improve clinical handover communication
(ACSQHC 2011). Similarly, the WHO Patient Safety Alli-
ance has identified communication failures during patient
handovers as well as medication accuracy at transitions in
care as part of its High 5-s initiatives (WHO 2007).
The study reported in this paper has aimed at developing
and validating taxonomy to support the analysis and clas-
sification of adverse events related to patient handovers.
1.1 Taxonomies in medicine and other domains
While communication obviously plays a central role for
successful handovers, more knowledge is needed about the
types of communication failures and their causes. A well-
established and systematic approach in safety critical
domains to studying causal mechanisms involved in acci-
dents is to analyze them in terms of a taxonomy of types of
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accidents and types of direct and indirect causes (or ‘con-
tributory factors’) (Wiegmann and Shappel 2003; Taylor-
Adams and Vincent 2004; Itoh et al. 2009; Mikkelsen et al.
2013). Nevertheless, communication failures are heteroge-
neous (Clark 1996; Sperber and Wilson 1995) and any single
episode of communication, even in a highly circumscribed
environment such as professional work in hospitals, will
typically involve a rich set of (tacit) background assump-
tions. Moreover, handovers serve functions that go beyond
the mere transmission and uptake of discrete items of
information, e.g., exploration of uncertainties (Wilson et al.
2010; Lingard et al. 2011; Patterson et al. 2007). Therefore, a
taxonomy to support the classification of communication
failures cannot be too detailed if it is to be useable.
A large number of taxonomies have been developed for
analysis of accidents and incidents, nearly always with the
explicit purpose of supporting learning from accidents.
General taxonomies for healthcare include the World Health
Organization’s classification scheme for adverse events
(Runciman et al. 2006, 2009; Kaplan et al. 1998; Mikkelsen
et al. 2013) and the London Protocol (Taylor-Adams and
Vincent 2004; Woloshynowych et al. 2005). Specific ones
have been developed targeted at, inter alia, anesthesia
(Marcus 2006); intensive care unit (Pronovost et al. 2008);
general practice (Rubin et al. 2003); and surgery (Antonacci
et al. 2008a, b). Nearly, all modern taxonomies for accident
or incident analysis are based on a systems view of mishaps
(Reason 1998), one of the earliest examples of which is
Rasmussens’ taxonomy targeted at capturing human–
machine interaction failures (Rasmussen 1982).
A taxonomy to classify incidents and accidents serves the
overall goal of improving safety by supporting learning from
experience. The specific goals of a taxonomy are to support
(a) case analysis by providing a conceptual framework in
terms of which events and relations may be captured and
linked and (b) the establishment of a database of cases that
are indexed in terms of the taxonomic categories used so that
it becomes possible to identify causal patterns across a
(possibly large) number of ‘similar’ cases. A further benefit
of using a database of events structured in terms types of
failures and possibly types of causes is that it enables users
who are dealing with a concrete case or safety issue with the
means of retrieving from the database ‘similar’ cases or
safety issues. This feature is particularly useful when the
database contains not only information about the causal and
demographic categories but also possible recommendations
about intervention and evaluation results of intervention.
2 Materials
Having considered using more generic taxonomies to
analyze handover events, the authors concluded that a
classification system specifically targeted at handovers
would be needed to capture the types of failures and factors
involved. For the development of the taxonomy, descrip-
tions of adverse events were drawn from two sources. First,
adverse event reports submitted to the Danish Patient
Safety Database (DPSD) were retrieved. The database,
created in 2004 when the law on patient safety introduced
the first national, non-punitive and mandatory reporting
system of adverse events and receiving about 25,000
reports per year, contains anonymized descriptions of
adverse events. Reports are supplied by healthcare pro-
fessionals, possibly edited or supplemented by a local
patient safety manager (Bjorn et al. 2009). The original
DPSD sample (N = 3,246) retrieved comprised all reports
submitted to the DPSD by one of the five regions in 2007
and classified as ‘breach of continuity of care’ or ‘failure of
communication or confounding’ (being two of the nine
categories under which reports were classified until 2010).
From the original sample, a random sub-sample was made
(200 events) comprising reports with a SAC score of 2 or 3
(18 % of the original sample). The SAC score (severity
assessment code) is a widely used risk matrix for assessing
the degree of risk of any given adverse event, where ‘3’
denotes serious events and ‘1’ less serious ones (Bagian
et al. 2001). The decision to include SAC [1 reports was
based on the assumption that longer reports contain more
information about causes of the adverse event reported
(median lengths of SAC2/3 and SAC1 reports in the ori-
ginal sample are 131/178 and 91 words, respectively).
Event reports from the DPSD would sometimes describe
several independent adverse events in which different
handover situations were described. In such cases, indi-
vidual events were differentiated and extracted as inde-
pendent events (178 event reports yielded the sample of
200 independent events).
The second sample to support development and test was
drawn from an interview study of handover adverse events.
The study, using the critical incident interview technique to
gather information about handover problems (Siemsen
et al. 2012), collected descriptions of adverse events related
with handovers from 47 individual interviews with staff
members (23 nurses, three nurse assistants, 13 physicians,
five paramedics, two orderlies, one radiographer) from
different departments and units: the emergency department,
two medical and two surgical departments, an intensive
care unit, a radiology unit, the orderly unit and two
ambulance stations. Both senior and junior staff members
were included from each unit.
The interviewees, who were promised anonymity when
recruited, received oral and written information about the
study emphasizing that the goal of the interview was to
obtain a comprehensive picture of the interviewee’s sub-
jective perceptions of critical episodes experienced at first-
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hand during patient handovers. Interviews were conducted
by two interviewers, one or both with healthcare
background.
In the 45 interviews (two pilot interviews were exclu-
ded), adverse events described by interviewees were tran-
scribed, yielding a sample of 232 separate critical event
descriptions. In addition, a small sample of descriptions of
individual events (n = 12) related to handover described in
root cause analysis was used to ensure that the taxonomy
was not too coarse-grained but capable of capturing causal
factors identified through more detailed accident analysis.
3 Methods
An iterative development of the taxonomy was performed
by the authors during which revised versions of the tax-
onomy were codified, followed by test of the revised ver-
sion of the taxonomy against ‘new’ events drawn from the
DPSD and the interview samples. Event descriptions were
drawn randomly from each sub-sample for each iterative
development. To reduce the risk that the taxonomy would
be biased by the kind of event descriptions contained in the
DPSD database, event descriptions drawn from interviews
and root cause analyses (as described above in Materials)
were used as well. The main structure of the taxonomy
remained the same during the development.
The process of development followed the standard
inductive approach of quality assurance of design: based on
meeting notes, one of the authors (HBA) would elaborate a
new version of the proposed categorization of failures and
factors including a definition of each of the categories. The
proposed division into and definition of categories were
then tested by the authors against samples of 5–20 reports
drawn randomly from the original sample of DPSD reports
or interviews, where each sample was analyzed, first
independently and next during consensus classification by
two of the authors (IMS, LFP). In case of disagreement, all
authors contributed until consensus was reached. This
process of iterative refinement of definitions of the taxo-
nomic categories was carried out for more than ten itera-
tions. The development phase was concluded when the
team was satisfied that each of the definitions was suffi-
ciently precise and that they, as a whole, were sufficiently
comprehensive to capture relevant distinctions among
handover events.
4 Results
The taxonomy consists of two groups of categories, active
failures and causal factors. Failures are divided into types
of handover failures that include acts of miscommunication
and refused, unclear or deferred responsibility among
healthcare staff in relation to patient handovers (Table 1;
‘‘Appendix’’). Inadequate communication is divided into
communication related to and not related to tests, each of
which is divided into sub-types. Inadequate communication
not related to test comprises omissions as well as unsuc-
cessful acts of communication. But it also comprises the
failure to address given aspects of patient care, for instance,
the failure to ask relevant questions or to address aspects
about the patient that, according to accepted standards of
care, should have been explored.
Causal factors associated with types of failure comprise
seven main groups including deviation from procedure or
guideline and inadequate professional competence or
knowledge of tasks (Table 1; ‘‘Appendix’’).
The test phase of the taxonomy development involved a
two-part test of the usability and reliability of the classifi-
cation system against two separate samples of adverse
events. Two of the authors (IMS, LFP) performed, inde-
pendently, a classification of two samples: A random
sample of 200 incident reports (SAC score [1) from the
DPSD database, and a sample of 232 handover incident
descriptions contained in the transcriptions of face-to-face
interviews with hospital staff. Of the sample of 200 DPSD
reports, 40 were used for consensus discussions, so only
160 were used for prior and independent classification to
assess inter-rater reliability.
Inter-rater reliability of classification into the five failure
types showed kappa values of 0.76 (DPSD) and 0.87
(interviews). A chance-corrected assessment of inter-rater
reliability such as the kappa statistics of causal factors of
the taxonomy is not possible, since this statistics cannot be
applied to inclusive (overlapping) classification, when a
given incident may be assigned to more than one causal
category. Pairwise agreement for two raters may be defined
as the number of agreed category assignments to a given
event divided by the number of assignments of either rater
(agreement/agreement ? disagreement). This corresponds
to the likelihood, for any event, that if one of the raters has
assigned a given failure type or causal type to the event,
then the other rater has done so as well. Pairwise agreement
of the five main of all causal factors was 62 % (for types of
failures it was 81 %).
The distribution of causes for each of the failure types
and sub-types is shown in Table 2. To avoid clutter
‘deviations from procedures’ is shown as a single column:
Only four events (1 % of sample) were distinguished fur-
ther into individual or organizational deviation from pro-
cedure. The most prevalent causes of adverse events are
inadequate competence (30 %), inadequate infrastructure
(22 %) and busy ward (18 %). Communication failures
related to and not related to tests accounted for 33 and
44 %, respectively, of failures of all types.
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5 Discussion
Inter-rater reliability of the taxonomy is satisfactory for the part
that may be assessed by a chance-corrected statistics. Most
authors follow the interpretation of kappa values suggested by
Landis and Koch: in the range 0.01–0.20 slight agreement;
0.21–0.40 fair agreement; 0.41–0.60 moderate agreement;
0.61–0.80 substantial agreement; and 0.81–0.99 almost perfect
agreement (1977). Fleiss suggests that a kappa above 0.75 is
excellent (1971). The achieved kappa between 0.76 and 0.87
indicates therefore that the taxonomy is reasonably robust with
respect to the divisions into types of failures. A pairwise
agreement rate of 62 % is not impressive, but may be regarded
as satisfactory, as this method of computing agreement tends to
yield lower quotients (Martin and Bateson 1993).
To assess an incident taxonomy, one should, besides
determining reliability, ask if the categories contained are
suitable and at an appropriate level of granularity (Wieg-
mann and Shappel 2003). Our distinction within failure
types between communication related to and not related to
tests may appear ad hoc. However, the settings for each of
these failures are typically quite different, since handover
communication related to tests is predominantly written
and schematic, whereas handover communication not
related to tests takes place in a clinical setting and is often
face-to-face and oral. Moreover, the distinction makes it
possible to identify possible differences in causal factors
behind different types of communication failures—and
therefore the possibility of different types of interventions
to reduce their occurrence (Siemsen et al. 2012).
Data about handover incidents are predominantly ret-
rospective (incident reports, root cause analyses), and
therefore, they typically contain few details about dialog
taking place during handover. Hence, taxonomies that are
useful for prospective studies (Lingard et al. 2004) in
which communication patterns may be recorded and coded
by observers are less suitable for analyzing the more sparse
data of incident reports. Arora et al.’s (2005) taxonomy
directed at handover communication distinguishes between
‘content omission’ and ‘failure-prone communication pro-
cesses.’ The former is similar to our sub-type ‘communi-
cation omission,’ which is reserved for those situations
where, as far as the evidence goes, no specific parameter
was misstated or misheard, but the staff members involved
Table 1 Taxonomy groups and categories
Group Category
Types of failure Communication about and clarification
of patient state (other than tests)
(A) Inadequate communication about patient state/care
(A1) Inadequate oral communication about patient state/care (not said or not
heard)
(A2) Inadequate written communication about patient state/care
(A3) Failure to address relevant patient state/care during communication
Communication about external
tests and examinations
(B) Inadequate/delayed (feedback on, follow-up to) test or examination
(B1) Test/examination not carried out
(B2) Omission of delivering feedback on abnormal finding
(B3) Result of test/examination received, but delayed follow-up
Refused, diffuse or delayed
responsibility
(C) Refusal of responsibility, diffuse allocation or acknowledgment
of responsibility
(D) Responsibility accepted but actual response delayed
Receiver unavailable (Y) Handover attempted, receiver unavailable
Causal factor Deviations from procedures (E) Deviation from procedure or guideline
(E1) Deviation from procedure or guideline (organizational)
(E2) Deviation from procedure or guideline (individual)
Competence (F) Inadequate professional competence or knowledge of tasks
(F1) Inadequate competence (organizational)
(F1) Inadequate competence (individual)
Omission (G) Omission–memory lapse or action slip
Other organizational factors (H) Inadequate procedures or guideline
(I) Problems with physical or functional infrastructure, including
access to or availability of records and other information
(J) Busy ward or interruptions
(K) Crowded ward
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in the handover do not address overall patient needs, e.g.,
acuteness (‘‘Appendix’’).
The causal factors contained in the taxonomy are rela-
tively coarse and not nearly as detailed as, for instance, the
classification system of the WHO Patient Safety Alliance
(2007). The reason for not dividing causal categories into
greater and more precise ones is the same as above: data
about handover events described in incident reports and
interviews (e.g., interviews that supply information to root
cause analyses) will typically not contain information that
allows for identifying sub-categories of causal factors with
any certainty. Similarly, most incident taxonomies allow
that a given failure may be assigned to more than one
causal factor (WHO 2007; Wiegmann and Shappell 2003;
Woloshynowych et al. 2005; Pronovost et al. 2008), though
not all (Kaplan et al. 1998). The drawback is that there is
no widely agreed method of assessing inter-rater reliability
or agreement—chance corrected or not—when causal cat-
egories overlap (Olsen and Shorrock 2010).
The taxonomy in its original version and as tested dis-
tinguished ‘deviation from procedure’ into an optional
division between individual and organizational causes of
deviations from procedures (Table 2). The term ‘individ-
ual’ is meant to suggest that individual training or
instruction will be the most direct remedy against repetition
of failure, whereas ‘organizational’ is meant to suggest that
the deviation is customary practice in the group or clinic
(similar to ‘routine violations’ as described by J. Reason
(1998). However, as the two samples used for validating
the taxonomy contained very few incident descriptions that
allowed this distinction to be applied (1 % of the sample),
we conclude that the additional effort in seeking to make
use of the distinction does not justify its inclusion.
The causal factor ‘inadequate competence’ is the most
widely applied factor (30 %). Pronovost et al. (2008) find in
their analysis of ICU incident reports that (inadequate)
‘training and education’ is a contributory factor in 49 % of
all cases, but their category also includes ‘failure to follow
established protocol,’ which overlaps with our ‘deviation
from procedure.’ Within ‘inadequate competence,’ our
taxonomy offers a distinction between ‘individual’ and
‘organizational’ contribution to the failure—again, a dis-
tinction that is based on the assumption that different
interventions are called for, depending on whether the staff
available do not have the competence that may be expected
given their qualifications or whether the staff available do
not have the qualifications required for the tasks at hand.
The information supplied in the event descriptions was
found to be sufficiently detailed to allow for this distinction
to be applicable: We found in about one-third of all cases of
inadequate competence enough details to determine that the
causal contribution was either organizational or individual,
approximately evenly divided (Table 2). Using a somewhat
different approach, Pezzolesi et al. (2010) have analyzed
and classified handover incidents from a UK hospital in
terms of the type of scenario they exemplify, e.g., ‘poor/
incomplete handover’ which refers to situations that
‘essential elements of patient’s care’ are not handed over.
The authors’ results are complementary to ours, except they
find that in 29 % of their cases, a patient is admitted to a
ward without the staff being informed. We had no such case
in our samples, and we do not know why this difference
exists between the UK sample and our Danish samples.
The subjective experience of the authors of the workload
required in applying the taxonomy is that considerable
efforts are spent on seeking to apply distinction below the
first level of types and categories (i.e., to what we have
called sub-types and sub-factors). Distinctions within fail-
ure types and causal factors that are theoretically justified
may therefore not necessarily be worth applying, unless the
information available clearly justifies their use.
There are limitations of this study. A chief limitation is
that the validation was carried out with the involvement of
the development team. This dual role of developer and
validator may have had the consequence that the raters
developed a tacit understanding of how to apply the cate-
gories that they helped in naming and defining. A more
rigorous test of the taxonomy would require an indepen-
dent team of raters to apply, independently, the taxonomy
to a body of incident descriptions. Another potential limi-
tation of the study is the selection of adverse event data.
There is no reason to believe that the DPSD reports used
are not representative of reports collected through reporting
schemes, nor do the settings for the critical incident
interviews appear to invite any bias (Siemsen et al. 2012).
But the level of detail in the data about handover failures—
both in respect of communication failures and fuzzy allo-
cation of responsibility—may be presumed to be greater if
prospective data were used, e.g., derived from an obser-
vational study.
6 Conclusion
Patient handovers are potentially hazardous situation fail-
ures, and so far, there has been no dedicated taxonomy that
captures both types of failures and causal factors. The pro-
posed taxonomy, being at a medium level of detail, has been
shown to be useable and robust and is therefore suitable for
capturing targeted at incident reports and narratives.
To spend resources—that might perhaps be spent more
profitably on other safety enhancing work—on classifying
incident reports into a system-based taxonomy is justified
only if it enables efficient production of knowledge needed
for reducing risk to patients. Results of such classification
will show patterns of causal factors, but knowledge about
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how to avert failures does not necessarily come from
scrutinizing classification results from a database of inci-
dents. Rather, the diversity of handover situations and
handover mishaps is such that insights into what goes
wrong and how to counteract failure mechanisms must be
based on the recognition that different types of failures and
different kinds of causal antecedents may require different
kinds of interventions. Therefore, a chief function of a
taxonomy such as the present lies in its ability to deliver,
when used to stoke a database, to safety managers cases
that are sufficiently ‘similar’—i.e., cases in which narra-
tives and analysis reveal similar failures and similar causes.
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Appendix
Category Explanation
(A) Inadequate communication about patient state/
care
A situation in which a patient is handed over from one healthcare staff member to
another (or plural: others) and in which the information handed over and/or received is
inadequate, missing or wrong. Information is inadequate when it should have been
given or requested according to standards for good practice but was not given or
requested
(A1) Inadequate oral communication about patient
state/care (not said or not heard)
Each sub-type covers situations where specific information was wrong or misunderstood
or was omitted. The staff members involved intended to include the information in
question but the intention failed(A2) Inadequate written communication about
patient state/care
(A3) Failure to address relevant patient state/care
during communication
Refers to situations where the staff members involved did not comprehend or did not
seek to explore the urgency or uncertainties of the required information and where the
information given or received is inadequate
(B) Inadequate/delayed (feedback on, follow-up to)
test or examination
Requisition is issued but test is delayed or is not carried out or is not reacted to as
prescribed or as intended by requisitioning staff member(s)
(B1) Test not carried out Requisition is not fulfilled (with/without feedback from laboratory)
(B2) Omission of delivering feedback on abnormal
finding
Requisition is fulfilled, but urgent finding is not reported as urgent
(B3) Result of test/examination received, but
delayed follow-up
Requisition fulfilled and test result returned, but not reacted on within relevant time span
(C) Refusal of responsibility, diffuse allocation or
acknowledgment of responsibility
Acceptance of responsibility is not clearly accepted, because either (a) the receiving staff
member refuses to accept responsibility or (b) assignment or accept of responsibility is
not clearly defined (person, task extent, time)
(D) Responsibility accepted but actual response
delayed
Receiving staff member accepts responsibility, but time of actual taking over of
responsibility is delayed
(Y) Handover attempted, receiver unavailable Receiving or intended staff member not accessible or available
(E) Deviation from procedure or guideline Procedures/guidelines are available but are not followed
(E1) Deviation from procedure or guideline
(organizational)
The deviation from procedures or guidelines is a regular practice in workplace
(E2) Deviation from procedure or guideline
(individual)
The deviation from procedures or guidelines is not a regular practice in the workplace
but is situationally or individually determined
(F) Inadequate professional competence or
knowledge of tasks
A staff member involved in the handover shows inadequate competence in carrying out
tasks related to the handover. Competence may be related to generic professional
knowledge and skills or to the concrete workplace.
(F1) Inadequate competence organizational A staff member involved is not qualified or has not received training or introduction for
the task(s) required in relation to the handover
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Category Explanation
(F2) Inadequate competence individual A staff member involved is nominally qualified by position and formal professional
qualifications for the handover-related tasks at hand, but shows inadequate competence
in carrying these out
(G) Memory lapse or slip Lapse of memory or action slip not related to knowledge and competence
(H) Inadequate procedures or guideline Procedure, guideline or instruction is missing, inadequate or wrong
(I) Problems with physical or functional
infrastructure
Problems with physical or functional infrastructures, including access to or availability
of records and other information
(J) Busy ward or interruptions Staff members required for handover-related tasks are not available due to busyness or
become interrupted while involved in such tasks
(K) Crowded ward Insufficient room/space, beds or physical facilities to accommodate or aid patients
Cogn Tech Work
123
Wiegmann DA, Shappell SA (2003) A human error approach to
aviation accident analysis: the human factors analysis and
classification system. Ashgate, Farnham
Wilson S, Woodward P, Galliers J, Randell R (2010) Beyond
handover: supporting awareness for continuous coverage. Cogn
Technol Work 12(4):271–283
Woloshynowych M, Rogers S, Taylor-Adams S, Vincent C (2005)
The investigation and analysis of critical incidents and adverse
events in healthcare. Health Technol Assess 9:1–143
Cogn Tech Work
123
